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FISHERMEN'S DOCK COOPERATVE, INC. V BROWN:




The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (Magnuson
Act or Act)' was enacted by Congress to conserve U.S. coastal fishery
resources and to maximize the economic and social utility of those
resources for U.S. citizens.' The Act has a fisheries management goal of
providing the "optimum yield" of all managed species,3 a concept which
is based on the statistically derived quantity of "maximum sustainable
yield" as modified "by any relevant economic, social, or ecological
factor."4 The mandatory consideration of these three factors, coupled with
the inherent uncertainty of fish stock assessment techniques, effectively
places broad discretionary power in the Secretary of Commerce (Secre-
tary) when promulgating yearly catch quotas.5 Considerable controversy
has developed over the scope of this discretion. Consequently the
question of whether the Secretary may protect the long-term viability of
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1998.
1. Pub. L. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-
1883 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997)).
2. See S. REP. No. 94-711 at 37 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 660-61; H. R.
REP. 94-445 at 45-46 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 613-14. See also 16
U.S.C.A. § 1801 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
3. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(4) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
4. Id. § 1802(21)(B).
5. The Magnuson Act places coastal fishery management authority in the Secretary of
Commerce. Id. §§ 1802 (23), 1855(d). The duty of recommending specific quotas is
delegated to the Regional Fishery Management Councils (RFMCs), who develop and submit
management plans to the Secretary for approval and promulgation in the form of regulations.
Id. §§ 1852, 1853(a), (b), 1854. See infra note 24 for a more detailed discussion of the
RFMCs.
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fish stocks to the economic detriment of commercial fishers has been
examined by several federal courts.
In one recent decision, Fishermen's Dock Cooperative, Inc. v.
Brown,6 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit joined the weight of
judicial authority by deferring to the technical expertise of the Mid-
Atlantic Fishery Management Council (Council)7 in setting the annual
fishery quota for the summer flounder fishery.8 Relying on a strong line
of case law favoring broad agency discretion with regard to technical
matters, the court of appeals unanimously upheld the Secretary's accep-
tance of the Council's recommendations, ruling that the quota determina-
tion was not arbitrary and capricious.9
In its ruling upholding the conservative quota, the court acknowledged
the Secretary's mandated duty to protect the long-term viability of coastal
fisheries resources.1" Moreover, the court recognized the discretionary
power vested in the Council to determine which scientific methods meet
the statutory standard of "best scientific information."" By extending
judicial approval to methods which tend to conserve resources rather than
maximize short-term economic gains, the court recognized a functional
approach for arriving at optimum yield where data and analyses suggest
a heavily pressured and possibly overexploited fishery. This Note argues
that such discretionary judgments should always favor the long-term
conservation of fisheries, by employing methods and judgments which are
risk-averse rather than risk-prone.
6. 75 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1996).
7. The Fourth Circuit reversed a district court decision, Fishermen's Dock Coop., Inc.
v. Brown, 867 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Va. 1994).
8. The quota appears at 59 Fed. Reg. 10,586, 10,587 (1994) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
625 (1996)). The taxonomic name for summer flounder is Paralichthys dentatus.
9. Fishermen's Dock Coop., Inc. v. Brown, 75 F.3d at 173.
10. Id. at 169. The court stated that the act mandates:
[A]ny fishery management plan prepared, and any regulation promulgated to
implement any such plan, pursuant to this subchapter shall be consistent with the
following national standards for fishery conservation and management: (1)
[C]onservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing, while achieving,
on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States
fishing industry....
Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (1994)) (emphasis added).
11. Fishermen's Dock Coop., Inc. v. Brown, 75 F.3d at 170.
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I. STATUTORY BASIS AND CASE LAW SURROUNDING
FISHERY QUOTAS
A. The Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976
Prior to the passage of the Magnuson Act in 1976, coastal fisheries
regulation was primarily the domain of state law.' 2 The Act federalized
coastal fisheries management by vesting regulatory authority in the
Secretary of Commerce. 3 More importantly, the Magnuson Act asserted
United States sovereign rights over all fisheries resources found within the
200 mile wide Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 4 giving U.S. fishers
priority in the harvest of such resources.
Congress declared several reasons for asserting regulatory authority
over coastal fisheries resources.'" Such resources are "valuable and
renewable," 6 the harvest of which "contributes significantly to the
economy of the Nation." 17 Congress recognized that fish are a finite
resource and that many coastal stocks were already overfished or nearly
so,' 8 but that if these stocks were properly managed they could provide
continuing "optimum yields."' 9 For these and other reasons,' Congress
determined the need for a national fisheries management program which
would prevent overfishing, rebuild overfished stocks, ensure conservation
and realize the full potential of the resource.2 Based on this determina-
tion, the Magnuson Act aims to effect: (1) the preparation and implemen-
12. See Catherine E. Decker, Note, Issues in the Reauthorization of the Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 1 OCFAN & COASTAL L.J. 323, 325 (1995).
13. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
14. Id. § 1811(a). The EEZ is a 200-nautical mile band of ocean running contiguous
to the entire U.S. coast. The Act originally declared U.S. jurisdiction over this area for the
purpose of fishery management. This "exclusive fishery zone" was later renamed the
Exclusive Economic Zone in 1983 when President Reagan proclaimed exclusive U.S.
jurisdiction over all economic resources in the zone. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg
10,605 (1983). See also 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(6) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
16. Id. § 1801(a)(1).
17. Id. § 1801(a)(3).
18. Id. § 1801(a)(3), 1801(a)(5).
19. Id. § 1801(a)(5).
20. Id. § 1801(a)(3), 1801(a)(4) (unregulated foreign fishing pressures); Id. §
1851(a)(3) (biological need to manage a stock of fish consistently over its entire geograph-
ical range).
21. Id. § 1801(a)(6).
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tation of fishery management plans (FMPs) in accordance with National
Standards; and (2) the establishment of Regional Fishery Management
Councils (RFMCs) to develop such plans under principles of "sound
judgment in the stewardship of fishery resources."'
The RFMCs are the most unusual and innovative features of the
Magnuson Act. Each of the eight RFMCs is charged with developing
FMPs for all commercially exploited marine fisheries found within its
respective regional jurisdiction.' Members are chosen for their expertise
and professional experience in fisheries science, management, and
harvest.2 The overriding goal of the RFMCs is to insure that all FMPs
are consistent with the National Standards, 2 a directive which invariably
22. Id. § 1801(b)(5). See discussion, infra note 25, for an elaboration on the National
Standards.
23. Id. § 1852(h)(1).
24. Id. § 1852(b)(2)(A). The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council has nineteen
voting members, twelve of whom are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. Id. § 1852
(a)(2). RFMCs include voting members from each of the constituent states, from the federal
government, and from the commercial and recreational fishing industries of that region. The
states are represented by their respective administrative directors in charge of marine
fisheries management; the federal government is represented by the Regional Director of the
National Marine Fisheries Service for that region; and the fishing industry representatives
are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, drawn from a list submitted by the Governors
of the various member states. Id. § 1852 (b). A RFMC's primary function of developing and
amending FMPs is accomplished through a prescribed cycle of scientific and statistical
workshops, committee deliberations, and public notice and comment. 50 C.F.R. § 625.20
(1995). Note also that RFMC members are not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee
Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 1, and are therefore allowed to vote on issues in which they have a
financial interest. 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1994); 16 U.S.C.A. § 18520)(1) (West 1995 & Supp.
1997).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1)(C) (1994). The seven National Standards as originally
stated by Congress are as follows:
Any fishery management plan.., and any regulation promulgated to implement any
such plan.., shall be consistent with the following national standards... :
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while
achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the
United States fishing industry.
(2) ... be based upon the best scientific information available.
(3) ... be managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of
fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.
(4) ... not discriminate between residents of different States.
(5) . .. promote efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that
no such measure shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose.
(6) ... allow for variations among, and contingencies in, fisheries, fishery
resources, and catches.
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involves balancing conflicting interests, uses, and management philoso-
phies. The Secretary reviews each FMP for consistency with the National
Standards.' This process transforms the FMP from an advisory document
into a set of enforceable administrative rules, and culminates with the
publication of the rules in the Federal Register.' The conservation and
management measures recommended in the FMP must be designed to
prevent overfishing and promote the long-term health and stability of the
resource.' The FMP must also assess and specify the current condition
of the fishery, the fishing mortality levels which will result in an "opti-
mum yield," and the allowable harvest rates and methods.29
The National Standards play a central role in the development of
management programs that balance the economic needs of those who
depend on the fisheries resources with the biological necessities of the
resources themselves. Three Standards of particular importance to the
present discussion collectively mandate that any conservation and manage-
ment measures promulgated as an FMP must prevent overfishing while
providing a continuing "optimum yield," must be based on the best
scientific information available, and must take into account variations and
contingencies in fisheries and catches.30 Congress addressed the complex-
ity of the tasks set out by the Act by creating a statutory framework that
(7) ... where practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.
16 U.S.C. 1851(a) (1994). Three more standards were added with the passage of the 1996
Amendments:
(8) Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation
requirements of this Act (including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of
overfished stocks), take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing
communities in order to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such communi-
ties, and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impact on such
communities.
(9) Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A)
minimize bycatch and (B) to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the
mortality of such bycatch.
(10) Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, promote
the safety of human life at sea.
16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(8), (9), (10) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
26. Id § 1854(a)(1)(A). The promulgation process includes standard notice and
comment procedures. 50 C.F.R. § 625.20(c) (1995).
27. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(a), (b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
28. Id. § 1853(a)(1)(A).
29. Id. § 1853 (a)(3), (a)(4)(A).
30. Standards One, Two, and Six. Id. § 1851(a)(1), (2), (6).
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provided the Secretary with an array of mechanisms for accomplishing
those tasks.
B. Court Decisions Involving Council and Agency Determinations
A sizable body of federal case law has developed around the question
of general agency discretion and its specific application to the Magnuson
Act. As discussed in this section, courts often grant considerable defer-
ence to agency decisions which rest on complex scientific and statistical
analyses, upholding them on a minimal showing by the agency that some
rational basis exists for the action in question. If the agency cannot show
a logical connection between mandated policy objectives and its corre-
sponding rulemaking decision, that decision fails the "rational basis" test
and is ruled "arbitrary and capricious."3 Courts rarely find that a rule is
"arbitrary and capricious," however, and will invalidate agency rulemak-
ing only in the most egregious circumstances.
A leading U.S. Supreme Court decision32 established specific guide-
lines for determining whether or not an agency action is arbitrary and
capricious. Stating that a court must consider whether the agency
considered all "relevant factors" before finding a "clear error in judg-
ment,"33 the Court explained:
[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.34
31. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is established in the Administrative
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A-D) (1994). The standard is incorporated into the
Magnuson Act at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(b)(1)(B) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
32. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
33. Id at43 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971)).
34. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. v. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
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The Court also noted that as long as an agency has examined all of the
relevant data and has satisfactorily explained its action, a court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.3"
Several federal circuit courts have also ruled on the question of
agency discretion. Sierra Club v. Marsh36 aptly illustrates the infrequent
case where a court has found that an agency totally disregarded relevant
factors in maldng its decision. In that decision, the First Circuit invali-
dated an agency decision not to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) as required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).37 The court ruled that not preparing an EIS was arbitrary and
capricious because the administrative record clearly revealed that the
proposed development project would have significant environmental
impacts.38
In contrast to the holding in Sierra Club,39 other circuit courts have
upheld agency determinations when the agencies have demonstrated a
rational link between the relevant factors under consideration and their
final rules.'4 In Virginia Agricultural Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. Donovan,41
the court persuasively noted that "[a]dministrative responsibility rests with
those whose experience is daily and continual, not with judges whose
experience is episodic and occasional."42 Stated from the opposite per-
spective, the court in Leather Industries of America, Inc. v. EPA43 ruled
35. let
36. 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985).
37 Id See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994). NEPA requires that an EIS be
prepared whenever a "major federal action" would have significant impacts on the human
environment. Id. § 4332(2). Where a preliminary environmental assessment yields a
finding of no significant impact, no further environmental study is required before
commencing the federal action. Id
38. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 877. The decision to forego the EIS was made
by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Federal Highway Commission in connection with
a proposed development project at Sears Island off the coast of Maine, an undeveloped and
pristine woodland area. Id at 870. The proposal was objected to by several other federal
agencies, including the Fish and Wildlife Service, EPA, NMFS, and the Coast Guard. Id.
at 874-75. The court reasoned that the two lead agencies had not adequately considered all
relevant factors in arriving at their decision. Id. at 881.
39. Id
40. See, e.g., Virginia Agric. Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. Donovan, 774 F.2d 89 (4th Cir.
1985); Natural Resource Defense Council v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993).
41. 774 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
42. Id at 92-93.
43. 40 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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that where an agency cannot show a rational connection between the
relevant data and its regulatory decision, the decision is arbitrary and
capricious.'
In a decision specifically addressing fishery quota allocations under
the Magnuson Act, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized
a presumption favoring the validity of agency rulemaking by ruling that
"[the court's] only function is to determine whether the Secretary 'has
considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made." 45 In another Ninth Circuit
decision, the court ruled that the Secretary had properly exercised his
discretion in selecting a particular scientific method to define the term
"overfishing."4 This decision is particularly relevant to Fishermen's Dock
because it affirmed that the Secretary has the discretion to choose the
scientific method which constitutes the "best scientific information
available" under the Magnuson Act.47
Several courts have ruled directly on questions of interpreting and
applying the terms "maximum sustainable yield" and "optimum yield."4
In 1977, the First Circuit ruled: "[t]he term 'maximum sustainable yield'
... refers to a scientific appraisal of the safe upper limit of harvest which
can be taken consistently year after year without diminishing the
stock ... so that the stock is truly inexhaustible and perpetually renew-
able. '49 The court in Northwest Environmental Defense Center v.
44. Id. at 405.
45. Washington Crab Producers, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 924 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir.
1990) (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S.
87, 105 (1983)).
46. Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Brennen, 958 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1992). In setting
quotas for coho salmon, the Secretary used an "abundance dependent method" to calculate
escapement goals instead of an alternative method proposed by the plaintiffs. The court
ruled that such a determination was within the Secretary's discretion and did not violate the
Act's mandate to use the "best scientific information available." Id. at 936.
47. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(2) (West 1995 & Supp. 1997).
48. "Optimum yield" is defined as:
[T]he amount of fish-(A) which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the
Nation, with particular reference to food production and recreational opportunities;
and (B) which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield
from such fishery, as modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor.
Id. § 1802(21).
49. State of Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043, 1046 n.4 (1st Cir. 1977) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 445, at 48 (1975)).
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Brennen"0 held that the Secretary reasonably defined "overfishing" in
terms of the level of fishing mortality that would jeopardize the long-term
capacity of the stock to produce maximum sustainable yields on a continu-
ing basis. The court also noted that the Secretary had properly considered
social and economic factors in arriving at his conclusions."'
More recently, a district court upheld a RFMC's decision to exclude
suspect data when calculating the annual surf clam quota. 2 The court
articulated three important principles which relate directly to the subject
case: (1) optimum yield (OY) is not the" same as maximum sustainable
yield (MSY); rather, OY is based on MSY; (2) management measures
must aim to achieve OY from each fishery on a continuing basis, not
merely for a single year; and (3) a plaintiff claiming the RFMC failed to
use the best scientific information available must show that certain factors
were excluded from the calculus, and provide reasons why the inclusion
of those factors would relieve the injury claimed. 3
III. THE CouRT's DECISION IN FISHERMEN's DOCK
The questions presented in Fishermen's Dock Cooperative, Inc. v.
Brown54 involve the Secretary's promulgation of the summer flounder
quota for the 1994 season.55 Using the statistical. procedures specified in
50. 958 F.2d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 1992).
51. Id
52. J.H. Miles & Co., Inc. v. Brown, 910 F. Supp. 1138, 1152 (E.D.Va. 1995).
53. Id at 1148-52. Additionally, two other district court decisions directly address
issues relevant to Fishermen's Dock In 1990, the District Court for the District of Columbia
determined that the plain language of the Magnuson Act envisions a balance between
conservation and socio-economic factors, noting that "while conservation of the fishery
resource is important, the Secretary may also consider other factors." National Fisheries
Inst., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. 210,219 (D.D.C. 1990). The same court considered
a slightly different question the following year, ruling that the court must look to the
National Standards when examining whether a FMP is supported by a review of the
administrative record. Southeastern Fisheries Assn. v. Mosbacher, 773 F. Supp. 435, 439
(D.D.C. 1991).
54. Fishermen's Dock Coop., Inc. v. Brown, 75 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1996).
55. The quota was promulgated under Amendment Two of the Mid-AtlanticSummer
Flounder FMP, which set a combined target fishing mortality rate of F=0.53 for the 1994
summer flounder season. 50 C.F.R. § 625.20(a) (1995). When setting the target fishing
mortality level, mortality generated by both commercial and recreational fishing efforts is
considered in the calculus. The term "F" is an index representing the fishing mortality
(target or actual) of the total "spawning stock biomass." Id.
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the FMP, the Summer Flounder Monitoring Committee 6 recommended
three different commercial catch quotas for the Council to consider.
One proposed quota represented the geometric mean of all summer
flounder recruit estimates for the previous five years, while the other two
quotas were one standard deviation above and below the geometric
mean.58 In practical terms, adopting the geometric mean quota permitted
a nineteen million pound harvest for the season, while the more conserva-
tive quota, one standard deviation below the mean, permitted a sixteen
million pound harvest.5 9
The Council recommended that the Secretary adopt the more conser-
vative quota.' ° When the Secretary approved the quota, the plaintiffs61
brought suit, claiming that: (1) the Secretary had failed to use the "best
scientific information available" in choosing to implement the lower quota;
(2) the failure was an arbitrary and capricious action; and (3) the plaintiffs
were deprived of the economic benefit of the additional three million
pounds of summer flounder.62
After three days of pretrial hearings focusing on the statistical validity
of the methods used by the Summer Flounder Monitoring Committee to
develop its quota recommendations,63 the district judge ruled that the
Secretary had failed to use the "best scientific information available" in
approving the lower quota, and that this failure was arbitrary and capri-
cious.6 4 He ordered the commercial quota to be re-established at the
higher nineteen million pound figure.65
56. The Committee is a group consisting of academics and professional fishery
managers, delegated by the MAFMC to gather and analyze the scientific data necessary to
develop the yearly quotas and long-term management strategies for fisheries. 50 C.F.R. §
625.2 (1995).
57. Fishermen's Dock Coop., Inc. v. Brown, 75 F.3d at 170.
58. Id. at 166.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Plaintiffs were several east coast commercial fishing interests, including
Fishermen's Dock Cooperative, Inc., Belford Seafood Cooperative, Wanchese Fish
Company, and Seafarer's International Union. Id. at 164.
62. Id. at 167.
63. Id. Several statistical experts and Committee members testified about the
mechanics of these methods and their practical implications in the quota setting process.
64. Fishermen's Dock Coop., Inc. v. Brown, 75 F.3d at 167.
65. Id. Recognizing that this remedy could not be applied retroactively because the
1994 season had passed, the Secretary ordered that 3.045 million pounds be added to the
upcoming (1995) season's quota. Id. at 173, n.2.
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The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the
Secretary's decision to set the quota one standard deviation below the geo-
metric mean was properly within the scope of his discretion,' and that the
Secretary's determination that the lower quota reflected the "best scientific
information available" was also within his discretion.67 Moreover, the
Secretary's decision was not arbitrary and capricious because he "engaged
in reasoned decision-making within the specific regulatory context."
68
The unanimous court rejected all of the appellee's contentions 69 and
reinstated the original quota.7" The court found that the district court had
misconstrued the meaning of the term "best scientific information avail-
able," and had therefore improperly overturned the Secretary's decision.7
The Fourth Circuit implicitly found that the Secretary's published
reasons z for using the lower quota reflected proper consideration and
66. Id at 172- 73.
67. Id
68. Id at 172.
69. Id at 173. In the defendant-appellant's brief on appeal, counsel for the Secretary
presented two arguments for reversing the district court's decision. First, the judge's
decision to conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing was improper and an abuse of discretion.
The court should have confined its review to the administrative record. Second, the
Secretary's well-supported reasons for choosing a risk-averse quota, which were reflected
in the record and published in the Federal Register along with the quota, were completely
overlooked by the lower court, which should have deferred to the Secretary's decision. The
appellant further argued that even if the Secretary's actions were arbitrary and capricious,
the appropriate remedy under the Act is to remand to the Council for further consideration,
rather than the court itself resetting the quota. Appellants' Brief at 15-16 (No. 95-1002).
Counsel for the appellee countered by asserting that the judge had properly conducted
the pretrial hearing given the complex nature of technical information involved, and had
correctly found that the quota represented by the geometric mean, rather than the quota
represented by one standard deviation below the mean, was the best scientific information
available. Therefore, the higher court should defer to the district court decision. Final Brief
of Appellees at 21-22 (No. 95-1002).
70. Fishermen's Dock Coop., Inc. v. Brown, 75 F.3d at 173.
71. Id at 171.
72. The court noted that the Secretary had published an extensive justification for
selecting the quota:
First, the summer flounder population was composed mainly of fish aged 2 and under,
so an overestimate in recruitment would have great power to cause an overestimate
in overall stock size and thus "would result in quotas that would exceed the target
fishery mortality rate (F level)." Second, "the probability of achieving the target F
level is higher at the lower harvest level" with staff estimating an 80% probability that
the proposed quota would keep actual F under target F. Third, three risky assump-
tions-that the previous year's quota would prove to have been adhered to, that all
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application of OY.73 Furthermore, the court relied on the quota-setting
process as described in the administrative record, giving no special
deference to the district court's extra-record fact-finding efforts. 74
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the Summer Flounder Monitoring
Committee's decision to recommend the lower quota was justified by the
standard deviation analysis used in determining the reliability and preci-
sion of flounder recruitment estimates.75 The analysis indicated that the
higher quota carried only a fifty-nine percent chance of resulting in the
target mortality rate, while the lower quota carried an eighty-one percent
chance of reaching the target.76 Citing the Secretary's reasons for choos-
ing the lower estimate,77 the court explained:
[T]he Council believed that the uncertainty in the recruitment
estimates was so great and the long-term flounder population so
fragile a resource for the fishers, especially in light of a coming
reduction in the target fishing mortality rate for 1996, that a low
estimate of recruitment was the prudent estimate.78
Additionally, even though the Secretary had chosen the lower quota, that
figure nonetheless reflected a twenty-eight percent increase over the
previous year's quota, 79 and as such could not be found to have damaged
the plaintiffs as claimed.
The court also stated that "the Department's mandate in setting quotas
is to manage great uncertainties in the data as best it can while taking the
long view of the state of the fishery and its users. "80 Thus, the Secretary
had properly allowed the factor of long-term stock viability to weigh
heavily in the calculus, and caution in the face of imperfect data is
landings get reported, and that discard rates would not increase-underlay the estimate
of the stock size and suggested that the stock-size curve might be overly optimistic.
Fourth, since the target F was scheduled to decrease dramatically for 1996, it was
better to err on the safe side now so as to minimize the chances of having to reduce
the 1996 quota even more than was already anticipated.
Id. at 166- 67 (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 10,586-87 (1994)).
73. Fishermen's Dock Coop., Inc. v. Brown, 75 F.3d at 166.
74. Id. at 168.
75. Id. at 170.
76. Id.
77. Id. See also supra note 72.
78. Fishermen's Dock Coop., Inc. v. Brown, 75 F.3d at 167.
79. Id. at 166.
80. Id. at 771, n.1.
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implicitly sanctioned by the Magnuson Act. The court concluded that the
district court exceeded the scope of its discretion by substituting its own
judgment for that of the Secretary's, in an instance where the Secretary
had articulated a sufficient rational connection between the scientific
analysis and the promulgated rule."1
IV. THE COURT FOLLOWS PRECEDENT AND CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT OF THE ACT
The holding of the court in Fishermen's Dock adheres to the rulings
of earlier cases involving fishery quotas, reiterates the importance of
agency expertise in matters dealing with scientific interpretation of stock
abundance data, and further refines the functional definition of "optimum
yield."' The holding recognizes a method for quantitatively estimating
OY, and highlights some of the differences between OY and MSY.
Moreover, it recognizes that Congress' first and foremost concern in
drafting the Magnuson Act was to preserve the long-term health and
sustainability of fisheries resources, a concern which justifies conserva-
tive, risk-averse decision making on the part of RFMCs when faced with
imperfect or suspect information about heavily exploited stocks.
The concept of MSY is commonly based on a method of fisheries
analysis known as the "surplus production model."'3 The model assumes
that an unharvested fishery will reach a population level commensurate
with the carrying capacity of its habitat, an equilibrium between the
81. Id. at 173.
82. See discussion, supra Part II.B. See also Washington Crab Producers, Inc. v.
Mosbacher, 924 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming lower court's deference to agency
expertise); State of Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043 (Me. 1977) (denial of Maine's request
for injunctive relief conditioned upon Commerce Secretary's immediate supplementation
of the record, so that deference to the Secretary's interpretation of optimum yield criteria
would be justified); J.H. Miles & Co. v. Brown, 910 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Va. 1995) (in
deferring to agency expertise, U.S. District Court noted that the "Magnuson Act envisions
balancing of several interests in determining optimum yield and management measure must
aim to achieve optimum yield from each fishery on continuing basis, not optimum yield in
single year." Id at 1148).
83. See generally Michael J. Van Den Avyle, Dynamics of Exploited Fish Populations,
in INLAND FISHERIS MANAGEMENT IN NORTH AMERICA 105, 127-28 (Christopher C.
Kohler & Wayne A. Hubert, eds., 1993). Two other types of models are also commonly
used: the yield-per-recruit model and the age-structured model. The surplus production
model is popular because its parameters can be estimated from commonly available
statistics. Id
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species' reproductive potential and its natural mortality rate. When this
natural "equilibrium" stock is harvested at a fixed annual rate, the system
arrives at a new equilibrium where the number of new recruits exceeds
reproductive adults.' The biomass equivalent of these "excess" recruits
is then classified as the harvestable "surplus production" of the stock.'
Harvesting at rates below the surplus production level has historically
been thought of as "wasting" the resource.86
After applying MSY in its pure form for several years, many manag-
ers noted distinct flaws in the underlying theory of MSY.' By superim-
posing the consideration of ecological, social and economic factors onto
the results obtained by MSY analysis, the concept of OY provides a
means of compensating for the flaws in the MSY paradigm.8" By using
OY, the maximum allowable harvest from a fishery can be adjusted to
provide the greatest benefit to society over the long-term. Congress
recognized the value of the OY concept, and mandated that OY be applied
to all FMPs. s9
Unfortunately, the OY mandate has been skirted, misconstrued,
manipulated, and occasionally ignored by the RFMCs and by the courts.
For example, OY considerations focusing on short-term economic and
social hardships have been used to justify an allowable catch of an already
strained fishery in excess of MSY. This approach, if utilized year after
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See H.R. REP. No. 94-445, supra note 2, at 47.
87. Three major flaws have been identified by commentators. First, MSY views each
fishery stock in isolation from the ecological factors operating directly or indirectly on that
stock, such as predator-prey relationships, disease, oceanographic and meteorological
effects, and the like. Second, MSY does not consider by-catch of non-target species, which
is often significant in multi-species fisheries. Finally, MSY fails to consider the "human"
factor in that it does not account for variations in fishing effort, technological improvements,
market demand, habitat degradation and pollution, and a plethora of other factors
attributable to the enterprises of humanity. For these and other reasons, MSY as a
management standard was a dismal failure for many fisheries. See generally Larry A.
Nielsen, History of lnland Fisheries Management in North America, in INLAND FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT IN NORTH AMERICA 3, 23-29 (Christopher C. Kohler & Wayne A. Hubert
eds., 1993); P.A. Larkin, An Epitaph for the Concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield,
TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES SOc'Y. Jan. 1977, at 1.; CARL WALTERS, UNIV. OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES 20-24 (1986).
88. See INLAND FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN NORTH AMERICA, supra note 87, at 25.
89. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
90. One example is the Georges Bank groundfish fishery. See generally Yva
Momatiuk & John Eastcott, Where Have All the Codfish Gone? WILDLIFE CONSERVATION,
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year, invariably results in a condition known as "recruitment over-
fishing"91 and may result in the catastrophic collapse of the fishery.
Consequently, the economic and social hardships sought to be alleviated
by such measures may actually come about more quickly, and with more
devastating effects for those displaced.' Such catastrophic collapse may
be avoid-ed if managers are encouraged to apply risk-averse measures in
all cases of heavily exploited fisheries, and to invariably give more
determinative weight to long-term sustainability than to short-term
economic benefits.93
Thus, while Congress directed the RFMCs to consider economic and
social factors as part of its OY calculus, it is clear that the overarching
intent of the Magnuson Act is to ensure that fish stocks are "truly inex-
haustible and perpetually renewable."' The legislative history emphasizes
conservative management as the preferred approach to OY, stating: "the
resource manager [applying OY principles] may well determine that a
surplus harvest below MSY will ultimately enhance not only the specific
stock under management, but also the entire biomass."95 These precepts
are reiterated in the Act itself, where Congress stated that a national
management program is "necessary to prevent overfishing... to insure
conservation, and to realize the full potential of the Nation's fishery
resources,"96 and that such programs should "achieve and maintain, on a
continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery. "I
May/June 1994, at 44; Fredric M. Serchuk & Susan E. Wigley, Assessment and Manage-
ment of the Georges Bank Cod Fishery: An Historical Review and Evaluation, 13 J.
NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERY SCI. 25 (1992); SONJA V. FORDHAM, CENTER FOR MARINE
CONSERvATION, NEW ENGLAND GRouNDFIsH: FROM GLORY TO GRIEF (1996).
91. See EDWIN S. IvERSON, UNIV. OF MIAMI, LIvING MARINE RESOURCES: THEIR
UTILIZAION AND MANAGEMENT 241, 247 (1996).
92. See Yva Momatiuk & John Eastcott, The Decline and Fall of the Northern Cod,
NATURE CAN., Winter 1994, at 17.
93. In the recent amendment to the Magnuson Act, Congress revised the definition of
the term "optimum yield" to be: "the amount of fish prescribed on the basis of maximum
sustainable yield 'as reduced' (rather than 'as modified') by any relevant economic, social
or ecological factor. This change prevents the maximum sustainable yield of a fishery from
being exceeded." 142 CONG. REc. S10900, S10907 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1996) (emphasis
added). The amending language unambiguously indicates that OY is not to exceed MSY
under any circumstances. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(28)(B) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
94. See H.R. REP. No. 94-445, supra note 2, at 47.
95. Id (emphasis added).
96. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(a)(6) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
97. Id. § 1801(b)(4) (emphasis added). See supra note 25 for an elaboration on the
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The enunciation of these principles in a statutory context represents
an adoption of certain ethical norms which have been vigorously advanced
by leading environmental ethicists since the turn of the century. In his
review of environmental ethics and its application to fisheries manage-
ment, J. Baird Callicott refers to utilitarian principles such as providing
"the greatest good of the greatest number for the longest time." 98 This
maxim implies a duty of stewardship-not mindless exploitation-and an
obligation to future generations that the resources we utilize today will be
zealously guarded for future enjoyment, social benefit and reasonable
economic use. Adherence to risk-averse management policies by the
RFMCs, such as those mandated by the recent amendments to the
Magnuson Act, 99 will help preserve fishery resources for use by future
generations. The holding in Fishermen's Dock reinforces this principle
and further legitimizes the conservation ethic.
V. CONCLUSION
In approving the Secretary's promulgation of the summer flounder
quota, the Fishermen's Dock holding illustrates the large degree of
deference given to the RFMCs in their development and recommendation
of fishery quotas. This Note supports the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit with one important proviso: the discretionary
balancing of the OY factors should always result in management measures
which best ensure the long-term sustainability of the fishery. Riskier
management methods adopted in pursuit of short-term economic goals
should not be afforded deference, and should be remanded to the RFMC
for reconsideration under conservative, risk-averse management princi-
ples.
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